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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
dence that the father acquired knowledge of the divorce decree before the
taking, but none to show that he knew that the exclusive custody of the
children had been awarded to the mother by a decree of court. Held, the
intent of the statute is to protect the parent from the kidnapper and not to
penalize the erroneous assumption of a parental right. Ignorance of the
decree of custody will excuse the parent, and he is not guilty of the crime
of kidnapping. Hicks v. State (Tenn., 1928), 12 S. W. (2d) 385.
In the case of State v. Taylor (Kan., 1928), 264 P. 1069, the Kansas court
held the principle apnounced in the above case, under a similar statute, to
be the same, but upon similar facts decided that the crime of kidnapping
had been committed. It was there asserted that the facts showed an intent
to deprive the lawful custodian of the child of such custody and that this
was sufficient under the statute. The principal case is guided by the de-
termination of the policy laid down by the legislature. It certainly seems
that a mistaken assumption of parental right should not be put down as a
crime, or at least that it should not be classified with the really serious
crime of stealing children by those whose whole intent is criminal. For
comment upon State v. Taylor, supra, see 14 ST. Louis L. REv. 200.
G. N. B., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- DUE PROCESS - STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS.-
A statute of Georgia declared that every insolvency of a bank shall be
deemed fraudulent for which the directors were punishable unless they
repelled the presumption by showing that the affairs of the bank had been
"fairly and legally administered, and generally, with the same care and
diligence that agents receiving a commission for their services are required
and bound by law to observe." Insolvency was defined as inability to meet
debts as they accrue; or the excess of liabilities over actual market value of
assets; or the falling of the reserve below the amount required where the
deficiency was not made good within thirty days. Defendant was convicted
under this statute and appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Held, that the statute was unreasonable and arbitrary and constituted a
denial of due process. Manley v. Georgia (1929), 49 S. Ct. 215.
It is within the general power of the legislature to declare that proof of
a particular fact or of several facts taken collectively shall be prima facie
evidence of the main fact in issue. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Go.
(1911), 220 U. S. 61. This power results from the right of the legislature
to change any rule of evidence now existing. Cockrill v. California (1925),
268 U. S. 258. But the presumption created by statute must not be un-
reasonable nor operate to deny a fair opportunity to repeal it. Bailey V.
Alabama (1910), 219 U. S. 219. "Mere legislative fiat may not take the
place of fact in the determination of issues involving life, liberty, or prop-
erty." McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co. (1916), 241 U. S. '79.
There must be a rational connection between what is proved and what is
to be inferred. ,Cockrill v. California, supra. Thus where proof of injury
inflicted by the running of locomotives or cars is made prima facie evidence
of negligence, the statute is not violative of due process. Mobile J. & K. C.
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Ry. Co. v. Turnipseed (1910), 219 U. S. 35. Nor is a statute which makes
the possession of a record of chances in a policy game prima facie evidence
of possession thereof knowingly. Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U. S.
585. See to the same effect Yee Hem v. United States (1925), 268 U. S.
179; Cockrill v. California, supra.
On the other hand, a statute was held unconstitutional which made a re-
fusal without cause to perform labor contracted for prima facie evidence
of an intent to defraud, the employee having received money which was not
refunded, where testimony by the accused employee in regard to uncom-
municated motives was inadmissible. Bailey v. Alabama, supra. See also
McFarland American Sugar Refining Co., supra. On the general question
see notes in 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007; 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226; and Ann.
Cas. 1912 A. 465. Since the legislature may create a presumption where
it did not exist before, it follows that the legislature may by repealing the
statute destroy the presumption. Virginia and West Virginia Coal Co. v.
Charles (1918), 254 F. 379.
In the principal case, the court ruled that there was not sufficient connec-
tion between the facts proved and that presumed. "Reasoning does not lead
from one to the other." The presumption of fraud was raised upon proof
of insolvency without regard to the facts from which the condition of in-
solvency resulted; and the statutory method of rebutting the presumption,
i. e., showing that the affairs of the bank had been "fairly and legally ad-
ministered" was considered to be too vague and indefinite. It would seem
that the decision is correct both on principle and authority.
J. N., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTOXICATING LiQuons.-Louisiana Statute per-
mitting householders to make and have intoxicating liquor for home use
held constitutional. State v. Schweitzer (1928), 167 La. 81, 118 S. 699.
The case concerns itself chiefly with the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution, and the court holds that a denial of permission to make
and have intoxicating liquors to other than householders is not a denial of
equal protection.
The interesting point, however, is that the statute permits the making
and having of intoxicating liquors at all; its constitutionality with reference
to the Eighteenth Amendment is not questioned, but is taken for granted.
It is well-settled that the Eighteenth Amendment did not take away the
states' regulatory power over liquor, nor did it supersede state statutes on
the subject, unless they were contrary to the amendment. Powell v. State
(1921), 18 Ala. A. 101, 90 S. 138; Kappitz v. U. S. (1921), 272 F. 96;
State v. George (Mo. A., 1922), 243 S. W. 948, and cases cited therein.
Since the amendment limits its prohibition to the "manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors," it has been held in one case that
a state may not prohibit the possession of liquor lawfully obtained. Spomer
t. Curtis (1923), 85 Fla. 408, 96 S. 836. However, the general judicial
opinion is that the states may prohibit the possession of intoxicating liquors.
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